A number of studies have revealed that the effect of industrial policy on productivity growth is negative. Is this because industrial policy fails to control the activities of firms, or because it can effectively control them? This paper attempts to answer these questions, using firm-level data from the cotton spinning industry in Japan for the period 1956-64. It has been determined that industrial policy cut two ways during this period. Industrial policy effectively controlled the output of cotton spinning firms, which contributed to the establishment of a stable market structure during the period.
Introduction
Whether industrial policy contributes to productivity growth is an important question in the fields of industrial organization, law and economics, and development economics (see Noland and Pack 2003; Rodrick 2007, Chapter 4) . Among industrial policies applied in various periods and countries, one of the most controversial policies is the Japanese industrial policy during the postwar period. 1 This controversy arises because the "success" of some Japanese industrial policies has been used to justify "targeting" policies in other countries, including the United States. 2 Because of this, several studies have investigated the effects of Japanese industrial policy (see Kiyota and Okazaki 2005) . An important lesson from previous studies is that, while Japanese industrial policy may have contributed to the growth of labor productivity, it did not contribute to the growth of total factor productivity (TFP). For example, Beason and Weinstein (1996) examined the effects of industrial policy on industry-level TFP growth in Japan. They revealed that industrial policy did not have a significant positive effect on productivity growth. Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) utilized firm-level data in Japan.
They found that industrial policy had a positive effect on labor productivity, but not on 1 The Japanese government implemented an industrial policy to control international trade, investment, technology imports, and foreign exchange (Noland and Pack 2003, pp. 23-37) . 2 "In fact, it is the success of Japanese targeting that is often used as the justification for targeting in the United States" (Beason and Weinstein 1996, p. 286) . Note that whether or not Japanese industrial policy was a "success" is still controversial, because total factor productivity would have fallen more without industrial policy. In this paper, the focus is on the mechanisms behind the negative relationships between industrial policy and industry productivity growth. A thorough evaluation of industrial policy is beyond the scope of this paper. 1 TFP.
Even though these previous studies were insightful, there is not yet a clear answer to why industrial policy produced a negative effect on TFP. This uncertainty is a result of two contrasting interpretations of the results. The first is that industrial policy failed to control the activities of firms and, therefore, lowered industry productivity growth. The second is that the government was able to control the activities of firms and, therefore, lowered industry productivity growth. The former interpretation implies that the problem lies in implementation, rather than in policy design, whereas the latter explanation implies that the problem lies in the policy design itself. Without clarifying these differences, it is difficult to assess accurately the effects of industrial policy.
To answer this question, the ways in which industrial policy affects the activities of firms need to be examined. However, most of the previous studies that have dealt with productivity have focused on the correlation between industrial policy measures and productivity growth, without focusing on specific changes in a firm's activities.
Moreover, previous studies on the effect of industrial policy on productivity have paid little attention to the legal framework and historical background of the time period, which makes it difficult to identify which activities were truly controlled by industrial policy. Indeed, adequate discussion on the effect of industrial policy on a firm's activities is missing from this literature strand. 3 This paper examines the effect of industrial policy on industry productivity growth. One of the major contributions of this paper is to provide a missing element in this discussion by presenting an explanation of how industrial policy affects a firm's activities, and why industrial policy lowers industry productivity growth. This paper also attempts to address explicitly the possible endogeneity between industrial policy and firm characteristics, which has not yet been explored in the literature on industrial policy. The focus is on the cotton spinning industry in Japan in the period 1956-64, an industry in which a key legal framework was implemented to control the output of cotton spinning firms during this time frame. This paper also contributes to the literature that examines the effects of policy change on productivity. In the international trade literature, on one hand, a number of studies, such as Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Kimura and Kiyota (2006) , have estimated productivity at the firm level, have found productivity differences across firms within the same industry (that is, firm heterogeneity), and attempted to link the differences to firm characteristics such as exporting activities. Although many theoretical models that motivate these examinations have in mind some exogenous policy shocks such as trade liberalization that affects firms differently (for example, Melitz 2003 ), most of the empirical studies do not actually identify particular policy shocks. In the industrial policy literature, on the other hand, a number of studies have examined the effects of particular industrial policies as noted. However, only a few studies utilize firm-level data. This paper covers the shortcomings of previous studies by utilizing firm-level data and identifying a particular policy change.
does not extend to a discussion of the link between industrial policy and productivity growth.
Focusing on the cotton spinning industry in Japan provides at least four advantages. First, the data cover almost all firms in the industry, which provides the opportunity to examine the effects on both small firms and large firms. Second, detailed information on physical inputs and outputs are available. This study thus avoids some of the potential problems in using monetary variables as proxies for inputs or outputs. 4 Third, precise information on industrial policy is also available from the literature on economic history and from historical records. Finally, the lessons drawn from industrial policy in Japan have implications for industrial policy in other countries, particularly developing countries (for example, Noland and Pack 2003) . This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews industrial policy in the cotton spinning industry in Japan. Section 3 explains the empirical model and data.
Section 4 presents the estimation results. The conclusions are presented in Section 5.
Industrial Policy and the Cotton Spinning Industry: A Historical Review of the

Legal Framework
Until trade liberalization in the 1960s, foreign exchange allocation was a basic tool for industrial policy in Japan. The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Administration Law of 1949 prescribed that foreign exchange should be concentrated in the government and that the government should draw up a foreign exchange budget to allocate foreign exchange quotas. The basic purpose of this system was to maintain a balance of payments by saving foreign exchange; however, it was utilized for industrial 4 For example, Klette and Griliches (1996) pointed out that the use of deflated firm-level sales as a proxy for firm-level output can be biased when used to estimate the coefficients of the production function. 4 policy purposes by the government, specifically the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
For example, for industries that depended upon imported raw materials, MITI could virtually control the production of each firm through foreign exchange allocations, which, in turn, supported the administrative guidance by MITI. In addition, foreign exchange for some raw material imports was allocated according to the export performance of each firm that used them (the export link system). This system was a powerful tool for the promotion of exports.
However, as the Japanese economy recovered from the damage caused by WWII, and increased its presence in the world economy, foreign countries, in particular the United States, increased pressure on the Japanese government to liberalize trade. In 1959, at the General Meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in Tokyo, the United States representative requested that the Japanese government remove import restrictions. To cope with this pressure from abroad, the Japanese cabinet decided on an action plan for trade liberalization in 1960 and, in practice, trade liberalization proceeded rapidly in the early 1960s (Fukao 1989; Nakakita 1993) .
The cotton spinning industry, the focus of this paper, was deeply involved in this foreign exchange allocation system. Its raw materials (inputs), raw cotton, as well as its products (outputs), cotton yarn, were classified as goods that could not be imported without foreign exchange allocation by MITI. In other words, the cotton spinning industry was not only protected from international competition through foreign exchange allocations for cotton yarn, but domestic competition was also regulated by MITI through foreign exchange allocations for raw cotton (Japan Spinners ' Association 1962, pp. 226-270; Korenaga 2000) . In the early 1960s, as part of a general policy change, the cotton spinning industry experienced trade liberalization. In April 1961, the import of raw cotton was liberalized and government intervention in the cotton spinning industry by means of foreign exchange allocations was discontinued.
Meanwhile, production and equipment levels in the cotton spinning industry increased rapidly. When World War II ended in 1945, the 10 largest firms dominated the cotton spinning industry, which came to be called "judai-bo." After the war, many smaller firms entered the industry and were called "shin-bo" and "shinshin-bo." These smaller firms, as well as "judai-bo", contributed to the expansion of the industry, in the areas of both production and equipment.
Consequently, from the mid 1950s, the cotton spinning industry was faced with excess capacity. To deal with this problem, an equipment registration system was introduced in 1956 through the Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment (Sen'i Kogyo Setsubi Rinji Sochi Ho). This law required that all firms register their cotton spinning equipment with the government as equipment to be used in specific categories of products and that only the registered equipment should be used to manufacture those products.
Every year, the government could approve new registrations if the capacity of registered equipment was likely to be insufficient to meet the forecasted, anticipated demand of the following year. If the capacity of registered equipment was likely to exceed anticipated demand in the following year, the government could instruct the firms to cooperate by suspending the use of excess equipment. In reality, no new registrations were approved, and hence the number of registered spindles did not increase after 1957 (Japan Spinners' Association, various half year issues).
In April 1959, the government decided that there existed 1.28 million excess spindles and instructed the firms to suspend their use, in accordance with the Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment. The suspension rate was defined as a percentage of the registered spindles, and was 7.5% for the firms with registered spindles of 7,000 or less. For firms with more than 7,000 registered spindles, the suspension rate was 7.5% for up to 7,000 spindles and 15% for any spindles over 7,000 (Japan Spinners ' Association 1962, p. 100) . This means that the operable spindles for each firm beginning in 1959 were reduced by at least 7.5%, depending on the number of the spindles they had registered. The suspension rate was reduced in October 1961.
The new suspension rate was 6% for the firms with registered spindles of 7,000 or less.
For firms with more than 7,000 registered spindles, the new suspension rate was 6% for up to 7,000 spindles and 12% for any spindles over 7,000 (Japan Spinners ' Association 1961, pp. 43-44) .
The role of the equipment controls increased after trade liberalization because, in the past, the government could effectively regulate the production of each firm through foreign exchange allocations for raw cotton (Japan Spinners' Association 1962, pp. 100-101). Hence, in 1959, the Japan Spinners' Association put forward a proposal requesting that a new "industrial order" be prepared to replace the foreign exchange allocation system, which had been "the central pillar for the regulation of the cotton industry" (Japan Spinners' Association 1962, pp. 84-85).
This proposal was reflected in the July 1960 amendments to the Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment. Two major reforms were implemented in this revision. First, the government was given the authority to order firms to suspend the use of their equipment to allow for short-term adjustments in production, in addition to making long-term adjustments. Second, fines were implemented to deal with firms that did not comply with these new government directives (Japan Spinners ' Association 1962, pp. 88-94) .
In October 1964, the amended law was replaced by the New Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment. This new law was proposed as a step toward deregulation of the cotton spinning industry. First, the clause on short-term production adjustments was deleted. Short-term production adjustments were left to the "depression cartel" provisions contained in the Anti-monopoly Law, which required One may be concerned that a focus on this industrial policy is an examination of an unusual case. However, it is indeed in line with the literature. For example, from the Schumpeterian view, industrial policy could provide greater incentives to invest in 5 Government intervention related to textile equipment continued until the early 1980s and was for the purpose of structural improvement of the industry. In August 1967, the Law on Temporary
Measures for Structural Improvement of Specific Textile Industries was enacted. The main objectives of this law were: 1) to dispose of excess equipment, 2) to increase firm scale, and 3) to update equipment. This law was followed by the Law on Temporary Measures for Structural Improvement of Textile Industries in 1974. For more details, see Korenaga (2002) . 8 new technology and processes, such as subsidizing technology development. This in turn stimulates competition among firms and could lead to rapid growth in productivity (see Aghion, Dewartripont, and Rey 1997) . On the flip side, if industrial policy forces firms to reduce capital stocks by taking spindles equipment out of operation, industrial policy will discourage firms to invest in new technologies and thus can cause a negative effect on productivity. 6 In the following sections, this issue is explored in more detail.
Empirical Model and Data
Estimation of the Production Function and Productivity
The econometric analysis on the dynamic framework is based upon firm profitmaximizing behavior, developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) 
(
Assuming that ) , ( nt nt nt k m φ can be approximated by a third-order polynomial and adding some technical assumptions, the consistent estimators of the production function are obtained. We employ the LP estimation to overcome the simultaneity problem to estimate the production function.
Data
The main source of data is Statistics on the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry Firms for which output or input information is not available, or is not positive, have been excluded. Firms that existed for only one year have also been excluded. The total number of sample firms exceeded 120 for every year. The numbers of workers covered in the dataset are 92,430 in 1956, and 76,405 in 1964 , which are 71% and 68%, respectively, of all the regular workers in the cotton spinning industry in Japan. 9
Output is defined as the weighted average of 12 output commodities. 10 Weight is defined as the sales share of each commodity. As mentioned above, sales data are not available from Statistics on the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry. Unit price data have been obtained from the Bank of Japan (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) to calculate sales. 11 Inputs are defined as labor, capital stock, material input, and energy usage. Labor is defined as the sum of production workers and white collar workers. Because data on white collar workers are not available for the periods before 1958, the number of white collar workers was estimated using the proportion of white collar workers to the total number of workers in 1959. Capital stock is defined as the number of operating spindles. 12
Material input is defined as the weighted average of the eight materials. 13 Weight is waste cotton yarn, 5) blended waste cotton yarn, 6) tokubo, 7) viscose staple yarn, 8) mixed spun rayon yarn, 9) blended synthetic yarn, 10) synthetic yarn, 11) cotton waste, and 12) rayon staple waste. 11 Note that the unit price depends on a "count," which is a unit that indicates the thickness of yarn.
The higher the count, the thinner the yarn. Thinner yarn is regarded as being of higher quality and, therefore, a higher count means a higher unit price. Although the unit price is available only for 20-count yarn in Statistics on the Japanese Cotton Spinning Industry, the conversion rate (the relationship between unit price and count) is available for cotton yarn and spun rayon yarn (Fujino, Fujino, and Ono 1979) . The unit prices for cotton yarn and spun rayon yarn have been adjusted, based on this conversion rate. This means that the unit price differs across different firms. For the conversion rate, see Table A1 . 12 The number of operating spindles refers to the average number of spindles actually operated in a certain year. Its upper limit was the number of operable spindles: the registered spindles minus spindles that were not suspended or out of order. Note that whereas no additional registration was approved after 1957, the number of operating spindles could change within the limit. defined as the share of material costs. Energy usage is defined as the weighted average of the three energy inputs. 14 The cost of energy is used for the weight. Unit price data for the material inputs have been obtained from the Bank of Japan (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) , as have unit price data for energy usage (Bank of Japan 1964). 15 Figure 1 presents the output share of the 10 largest firms, namely "judai-bo," for 1956 -1979 . Except in 1964 industrial policy), the ratio of suspended spindles was used, which is defined as the ratio of the number of suspended spindles to the total registered spindles. 17 Because the suspended spindles ratio was different across different firms, the ratio allows the capture of the industrial policy effect at the firm level.
=== Table 1 [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] . However, in some firm-years, the ratios were outside these ranges. Because it is impossible to identify whether firms mistakenly reported these figures or broke the law, the analysis was conducted assuming that these figures were reported correctly. synthetic yarn to material inputs increased from 0% in 1958 to 7% in 1968. This result may support the view that the introduction of synthetic yarn improved the productivity of the cotton spinning firms. 18 Third, the industrial policy controlled the amount of equipment used by firms after 1959. On average, the ratio of suspended spindles is 6.8-8.6% after the suspension of spindles started in 1959. Finally, the correlation between the suspended spindles ratio and firm size (measured by the capital stock) ranges between 0.40 and 0.48. This implies that the suspended spindles ratio is not just a proxy for firm size but that it may be related to firm size.
These results seem to suggest that, through the regulation on equipment, industrial policy made a significant contribution to raising labor productivity while also controlling firm output to maintain a stable market structure. Indeed, the growth in labor productivity and the maintenance of a stable market structure are surprising, considering the fact that the cotton spinning industry was faced with a substantial change in the technological environment. An example of these changes is the widespread adoption of synthetic fiber as an intermediate input, given that the Japanese economy experienced rapid growth during the 1960s and a severe recession in the early 1970s. Note, however, that labor productivity may not be a good indicator of productivity, because labor productivity increases not through an increase in the efficiency of workers, but through an increase in other types of inputs, such as capital or 18 For example, Nagahama (1965, pp. 5-6) stated that the synthetic yarn enabled the cotton spinning firms to control the quality of staple more easily, which improved firm productivity. However, none of the previous studies has statistically examined the relationship between the use of the synthetic yarn and firm productivity. Section 4.2 addresses this issue in more detail. energy. To control the effects of the other factors, the next section estimates TFP. 19 Table 2 presents the estimates of the input coefficients from the production function. The production function was estimated using all cotton spinning firms included in the source data for 1956-64 (unbalanced panel), based on OLS and LP estimation. 20 The estimates of the coefficients derived from LP estimation are significantly different from those derived from OLS. While the OLS results reject the null hypothesis that the production function has constant returns to scale, the LP estimation results do not reject the null hypothesis. This implies that the coefficients are biased downward in OLS estimation and, therefore, LP estimation successfully eliminates the simultaneity bias. These results also suggest that the Japanese government does not necessarily target increasing returns to scale in the sector.
Results
Firm-Level Productivity
=== Table 2 === Table 3 presents the (unweighted) annual average level of growth in labor productivity and TFP between 1956 and 1964. TFP is obtained from LP estimation. Table 3 also reports levels and growth rates for both large and small firms. 21 In 19 As noted, investment data are not available from this data source. The LP estimation method is applied to estimate TFP. 20 Table A2 presents entry and exit patterns. 21 To simplify the discussion, large firms are known as "judai-bo", and "shin-bo" and "shinshin-bo" 16 Section 2, the year identified was when the industrial policy was enacted (that is, 1959).
Productivity growth was compared before and during the times the industrial policy was enacted, to assess the productivity implications of industrial policy.
=== Table 3 === Three findings stand out from this table. First, labor productivity grew rapidly, even after the industrial policy was enacted. The annual average growth rate was 5.59% for 1956-59 and 2.76% for 1959-64. Second, by contrast, TFP did not show significant growth. The annual average rate of TFP growth was 0.65% and 0.27% for the years 1956-59 and 1959-64, respectively. As noted in the introduction, these results are consistent with the findings of previous studies, such as Beason and Weinstein (1996) and Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) .
Finally, both labor productivity and TFP growth rates for large firms were consistently lower than those for small firms. For example, the TFP growth rate for small firms was 0.70% for 1956-59, whereas the rate for large firms was -0.01%. Moreover, the TFP growth rate for large firms for 1959-64 was -0.72%. This result is surprising when combined with the knowledge that large firms maintained around a 48% market share between 1957 and 1964 ( Figure 1 and Table 1 ), despite their productivity decreasing during this period. In addition, it is also interesting to note that the difference in TFP growth between large and small firms is not necessarily attributable to the catch-up process of small firms. This is because on average, the are small firms. TFP level of small firms is greater than that of large firms throughout this period. Table 3 simply presents the difference in productivity growth before and during industrial policy. Hence, it is not clear whether industrial policy has created significant negative effects on the efficiency of the cotton spinning firms. The results clearly confirm that the output share of large firms was not supported by either efficiency or by an unobservable effort that would have been captured by TFP. This result implies that industrial policy effectively controlled a firm's activities. The next section examines in more detail the implications of these findings for industry productivity growth.
Note that
Productivity and Industrial Policy
To examine the effects of industrial policy on productivity, we employ the methodology that is used to examine the effects of trade liberalization on productivity.
Similar to Pavcnik (2002) , and Amiti and Konings (2007) , the possible links between industrial policy and firm-level productivity are specified as follows: , ) ( χ denotes year-fixed effects that control for industry-level shocks over time (for example, demand shocks), denotes the ratio of suspended spindles that captures the effects of industrial policy, and ratio spindles suspended nt υ denotes the error term. As a control variable, a synthetic yarn-material input ratio was included to control for the effects of the introduction of synthetic fiber. The suspended spindles ratio and the synthetic yarn ratios are the same as those used in yarn synthetic Table 1 . Table 4 presents the regression results. Columns (1) and (2) indicate the results of the fixed-effects and random-effects models, respectively. The synthetic yarn-material ratio shows significantly positive coefficients, which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence discussed in Section 3.2. On the other hand, the suspended spindles ratio does not have a significant sign. Note however, that the suspended spindles ratio could be endogenous as Section 2 found that the suspension rate was different according to the number of registered spindles. Another regression was run in order to address the possible endogeneity of industrial policy. The ratio of suspended spindles is treated as an endogenous variable, while capital stock and other exogenous variables are instrumental variables (IV). 22 === Table 4 === Column (3) presents the two-step efficient GMM estimator. Firm-specific fixed effects are included to control for the unobservable heterogeneity of firms. 23 The endogenous (GMM distance) test statistic rejects the null that the suspended spindles ratio can be treated as exogenous at the 95% level. In the first stage regression results, the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification Lagrange multiplier (LM) test rejects the null hypothesis that the equation is underidentified at the 99% level. The weak identification Wald F statistic exceeds 10, "the rule of thumb" of Staiger and Stock 22 Other exogenous variables are the synthetic yarn-material ratio and year dummies. 23 The time-invariant "judai-bo" (that is, large firms) specific effects are wiped out by the firmspecific fixed effects.
19 (1997) . The null hypothesis that the instrument is weak is rejected at the significant critical value.
These results suggest that the instruments have some validity. The regression results indicate that, once the endogeneity of industrial policy is controlled for, the coefficient of the suspended spindles ratio turns out to be significantly negative. The result implies that industrial policy produces negative effects on TFP. The coefficients of the OLS fixed-and random-effects models are biased because of the endogeneity. 24 Figure 1 and Table 1 indicate that industrial policy effectively controlled the output of cotton spinning firms. Table 3 shows that TFP growth in large firms was negative during this period, and Table 4 indicates that industrial policy produced significant negative effects on the productivity of firms. Note that these figures are derived from an (unweighted) arithmetic average of firm-level productivity. We extend the analysis to assess the implications for overall industry productivity growth.
Industry Productivity Growth
As in Olley and Pakes (1996) , the aggregate productivity level is defined as the weighted average of firm-level productivity, with the share of industry output defined as 24 One may be concerned that the results are influenced by the firms whose suspended spindles ratios are outside the ranges (see footnote 23). An alternative ratio was constructed that takes the upper limit value (0.15 for 1959-1960 and 0.12 for 1961-1964) if the ratio exceeds the upper limit value and takes the lower limit value (0.075 for 1959-1960 and 0.06 for 1961-1964) if the ratio becomes smaller than the lower limit. A regression was then run, replacing the suspended spindles ratio with this alternative ratio. It was found that the regression results were qualitatively similar in each case. 20 the weight:
where is the share of firm 's output in the cotton spinning industry in year .
Note that aggregate productivity growth is driven not only by continuing firms but also by entering/exiting firms. To incorporate the effect of entry/exit into the aggregate productivity growth, following Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) , the aggregate productivity growth was decomposed using a modified version of Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) . the difference in the productivity growth between large and small firms, the within and between effects were further decomposed for large and small firms, respectively. 26 Table 5 presents the decomposition of the industry productivity growth. The major findings are threefold. First, the industry productivity growth was positive between 1956 and 1959, but turned negative between 1959 and 1964. In addition, the aggregate industry growth moved in tandem with the within effect. This finding suggests that the industry productivity growth can be attributed to each firm's own 25 See the Appendix for an explanation of how the decomposition is computed. 26 A similar decomposition exercise can be found in Baily, Halten, and Campbell (1992) . 21 productivity growth. Second, the large firms demonstrated a lower within effect than the small firms. The within effects of the large firms were -0.01% for 1956-59 and -0.44% for 1959-64. The within effects of the small firms were 0.35% and 0.04% for 1956-59 and 1959-64, respectively. === Table 5 === Third, the between effect did not contribute to industry productivity growth, especially after 1959. This result implies that the reallocation of resources from the less productive large firms to the more productive small firms was ineffective during this period. Industrial policy effectively controlled the output of the firms.
Simultaneously, however, this control also restricted the reallocation of resources across these same firms. Combined with the negative TFP growth of the large firms, industrial policy resulted in overall negative industry productivity growth.
Conclusion
This paper examined the effect of industrial policy on industry productivity growth. A detailed historical review of the industrial policies within the cotton spinning industry was first provided, in which the government introduced a major legal framework: the suspension of equipment after 1959. This measure was designed to indirectly control the output of cotton spinning firms.
Using firm-level data from the cotton spinning industry for 1956-64, estimations were then made on firm productivity and the industry as a whole, both before and during the industrial regulation period. The major findings are summarized as follows.
22
First, industrial policy effectively controlled the output of cotton spinning firms. The output share of the 10 largest firms, which are called "judai-bo," remained stable from the late 1950s, after the Law on Temporary Measures for Textile Industry Equipment was enacted. The market share of these large firms remained almost constant throughout this period.
Second, cotton spinning firms experienced low total factor productivity (TFP) growth from 1956 to 1964. The (unweighted) annual average growth rate was 0.27%.
The TFP growth rate for large firms was consistently lower than the rate for small firms.
The annual average TFP growth rate for large firms for 1959-64 was -0.72%, while the rate for small firms was 0.35%. Therefore, the aggregate (weighted) industry productivity growth turned negative between 1959 and 1964. Third, industrial policy had negative effects on firm productivity. Besides, as a consequence of industrial policy, the reallocation effect did not work during this period. Combined with the negative TFP growth rates of the large firms, industrial policy resulted in overall negative productivity growth in the cotton spinning industry.
What would the TFP record have been without the policy intervention?
Although our estimates cannot precisely answer this question, it is useful to discuss the counterfactual evidence. As was indicated in Figure 1 , industrial policy made a significant contribution to the maintenance of a stable market structure for two decades in the sense that the output share of the 10 largest firms remained almost constant throughout the period. Based on the fact that the productivity level of these firms was lower than that of other small firms (Table 3) , the output share of the 10 largest firms would have declined without industrial policy. On the flip side, as was observed in several studies such as Olley and Pakes (1996) , deregulation would cause a reallocation 23 of capital toward more productive firms. This implies that the output share of firms with higher productivity would increase. The growth of overall industry productivity could mark a positive in the cotton spinning industry.
One important policy implication that can be drawn from this analysis is that industrial policy often cuts two ways. Industrial policy may be effective in controlling a firm's activities, such as output levels. This control, however, implies that the industrial policy also constrains the reallocation of resources across the firms. This type of policy will be effective when large firms achieve high rates of productivity growth. Otherwise, the policy will fail. Policymakers should recognize that industrial policy can be a double-edged sword.
Future research should include a more thorough investigation of the validity of Levinsohn-Petrin (LP) estimation in analyzing the effects of policies, as an important extension. LP estimation assumes perfectly competitive input markets. However, various policies such as industrial policy and trade policy could distort the input markets and generate some imperfectly competitive environments. This may cause biases in the LP estimator. It is also important to control for the quality of the inputs, such as the difference between high-and low-quality capital to estimate firm productivity more precisely.. Further investigation on the endogeneity of industrial policy is another important extension. To conduct such an analysis, it is imperative that the quality and coverage of the firm-level data and policy variables be improved and expanded.
Appendix. Decomposition of Industry TFP Growth
To decompose the industry productivity growth t ω Δ , we follow the method used by Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) as follows:
is the correlation between increases in the firm's output share and its productivity growth; and , , and C N X represent the set of continuing firms, entering firms, and exiting firms, respectively.
The first term indicates each firm's own productivity growth, weighted by the industry share of each firm in year 1 − t . This is sometimes called the "within" effect.
The second term represents the changes in the shares, weighted by the deviation of the productivity level from the industry average level in year 1 − t . The second term captures the changes in the shares, which is sometimes called the "between" effect, or alternatively, the "reallocation" effect. The third term captures the correlation between the changes in the shares and the productivity growth, which is called the "covariance" effect. The fourth and last terms represent the effects of entry and exit, respectively.
We use equation (A1) to decompose the industry productivity growth. Notes: Unweighted arithmetic annual average is reported. Large firms are the top 10 largest firms (judai-bo) while small firms are other firms. Robust standard errors are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistically significant levels at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimated by the random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the fixed effects estimator. For IV estimation, suspension rate is treated as endogenous variable while capital stock and other exogenous variables are as instruments. Two-step GMM estimation is used for the second stage. In IV estimation, one observation is not used because of the singleton group. 
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